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Abstract—The Secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB) is a
key component of verifiable election systems. However,
there is very little in the literature on their specification,
design and implementation, and there are no formally
analysed designs. The WBB is used in the context of
election verification to publish evidence of voting and
tallying that voters and officials can check, and where
challenges can be launched in the event of malfeasance.
In practice, the election authority has responsibility
for implementing the web bulletin board correctly
and reliably, and will wish to ensure that it behaves
correctly even in the presence of failures and attacks. To
ensure robustness, an implementation will typically use
a number of peers to be able to provide a correct service
even when some peers go down or behave dishonestly.
In this paper we propose a new protocol to implement
such a Web Bulletin Board, motivated by the needs of
the vVote verifiable voting system. Using a distributed
algorithm increases the complexity of the protocol
and requires careful reasoning in order to establish
correctness. Here we use the Event-B modelling and
refinement approach to establish correctness of the
peered design against an idealised specification of the
bulletin board behaviour. In particular we have shown
that for n peers, a threshold of t > 2n/3 peers behaving
correctly is sufficient to ensure correct behaviour of
the bulletin board distributed design. The algorithm
also behaves correctly even if honest or dishonest peers
temporarily drop out of the protocol and then return.
The verification approach also establishes that the
protocols used within the bulletin board do not interfere
with each other. This is the first time a peered secure
web bulletin board suite of protocols has been formally
verified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Verifiable voting systems such as Preˆt a` Voter
[CRS05], [RBH+09], Scantegrity [CCC+10],
Helios[Adi08], Wombat [BNFL+12], STAR-Vote
[BBB+13] and Civitas [CCM08] typically have a
requirement to publish information concerning votes
cast and how they have been processed, in order to
provide verifiability. Voters and other external parties
are able to check the published information and
challenge the election if any cheating has occurred.
Such systems are generally described using a
“Bulletin Board” for publication: a repository of the
information collected throughout the election, made
publicly available for inspection.
There are certain (generally implicit) security as-
sumptions on the bulletin board: that once items are
on the bulletin board then they will not be removed,
that the final information given at the end of the
election is fixed and cannot be adjusted, and that
it will provide the same view of that information
to all parties. For example, Adida’s characterisation
[Adi06] states that “Cryptographic voting protocols
revolve around a central, digital bulletin board. As its
name implies, the bulletin board is public and visible
to all, via, for example, phone and web interfaces. All
messages posted to the bulletin board are authenti-
cated, and it is assumed that any data written to the
bulletin board cannot be erased or tampered with.”
Alternatively a bulletin board has been described as a
“broadcast channel with memory” [Pet05], [CGS97],
[KTV12], with a Web Bulletin Board treated as a
public broadcast channel.
Achieving these properties in an implementation is
not so straightforward. A current view is that “we
don’t know how to build a secure bulletin board”
[Wag13], and to date there is no generally avail-
able implementation of a secure bulletin board. In
practice bulletin boards are generally implemented
by collecting election information as it progresses,
and publishing the information via a website, as done
for example by Helios, Wombat, and STAR-Vote,
or making it available via a git repository as in the
Norway 2013 e-voting trial[Nor13]. However, these
are not tamper proof, and information can be changed
on them unless there are additional safeguards such
as the cryptographic mechanisms based on hash
chains proposed by Heather and Lundin [HL08].
The design of STAR-VOTE uses multiple peers to
tolerate faulty or malicious components, and has the
election authority sign the bulletin board contents,
thus changes can occur only with the collusion of
the electoral authority.
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the need to implement a bulletin board as part of
the vVote system being developed for the Victorian
State election 2014 [BCH+12]. The Victorian State
election runs over a two week period of “early
voting” before election day itself, and the bulletin
board is required to publish its information daily
during the election. For robustness and trust the
bulletin board will be comprised of a number of
peers to receive items, provide receipts, and publish
information. The rate at which votes may be received
means that the peers cannot sustain the overhead of
a consensus protocol every time an item is posted, so
they each maintain a local copy of their view of the
bulletin board, and agree on the bulletin board only
when it is time to publish. A further challenge is that
the bulletin board may need to reject some items,
for example any vote on a ballot previously used or
audited, so that incompatible posts are not published.
We achieve this requirement provided a threshold
of the peers are honest and operational the bulletin
board will behave correctly, even in the presence of
individual peers going down, external attacks and a
minority of dishonest peers.
This paper presents a new bulletin board protocol
designed to run with a network of peers and to
operate correctly when a threshold of the peers are
honest and operational. We provide a formal model
and verification of the protocol, using the framework
of Event-B [Abr10]. We verify the protocol in the
context of a Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83], who has
control over the network and a minority of peers.
II. A PEERED BULLETIN BOARD PROTOCOL
We present an implementation of a bulletin board
that accepts items to be posted (if they do not clash
with previous posts), issues receipts, and periodically
publishes what it has received. The bulletin board
published for any particular period must include all
items that had receipts issued during that period.
Robustness is achieved through the use of several
peered servers which cooperate on accepting items,
issuing receipts, and publishing the bulletin board.
They make use of a threshold signature scheme
which allows a subset of the peers above a particular
threshold to jointly generate signatures on data. The
peers collectively provide the bulletin board service
as long as a threshold of them are honest, and as
long as a threshold of them are involved in handling
any item posted to the bulletin board. Thus the
implementation is correct in the presence of com-
munication failures, unavailability or failure of peers,
and also dishonesty of peers. The threshold t required
to achieve this must be greater than two-thirds of
the total number n of peers: t > 2n/3. There is no
single point of failure: the system can tolerate failure
or non-participation of any component, as long as a
threshold of peers remain operational at any stage.
It also allows for different threshold sets of peers to
be operational at different times. For example, a peer
may be rebooted during the protocol, missing some
item posts, and may then resume participation.
The key properties we require for this bulletin board
are:
(bb.1) only items that have been posted to the
bulletin board may appear on it;
(bb.2) any item that has a receipt issued must
appear on the published bulletin board;
(bb.3) two clashing items must not both appear on
the bulletin board;
(bb.4) items cannot be removed from the bulletin
board once they are published.
It follows from bb.2 and bb.3 that if two items clash
then receipts must not be issued for both of them.
The bulletin board provides a protocol for the posting
of an item and its acknowledgement with a receipt,
and provides another two related protocols for the
publishing of the bulleting board: an optimistic one,
and a fallback.
Notation: The protocols make use primarily of in-
dividual signatures and a threshold digital signature
key SSK. We use ski to refer to Peer i’s individual
signing key, and sski to refer to Peer i’s share of the
threshold signing key SSK. The item sigk(x) denotes
x signed with signature key k.
Posting and acknowledgement: The protocol for
posting an item x in period p, and issuing the
acknowledgement, is as follows:
1. User → Pi : x (i ∈ I)
each Pi checks no clash with previous posts
2. Pi → Pj : sigski(p, x) (i, j ∈ I, j 6= i)
each Pi waits for a threshold number of signatures
3. Pi → User : sigsski(p, x) (i ∈ I)
To post an item x, the User should first send x
to each of the peers, as shown in Round 1. Each
peer checks that x does not clash with any posts
it has received previously (from the current period
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their own individual signing key, and send the result
to each of the other peers, as shown in Round 2.
Peers store all of the received signatures into their
local database. Finally, once a peer has obtained a
threshold number of signatures on (p, x) (including
its own), it sends its share of the threshold signature
on (p, x) back to the User. Once the User has received
a threshold number of such shares it is able to
combine them to provide a signature on (p, x), and
this serves as the receipt. This protocol is shown in
Figure 1. It is repeated for each item to be posted in
the period.
Publishing the Bulletin Board: the bulletin board is
published at the end of the period. The aim is for the
peers to agree on the contents of the bulletin board
and to issue their signature share on it to a public
hosting service that can combine the signature shares
and make the resulting signature publicly available.
Peer i’s local record of the bulletin board Bi,p is
those items that it has received a threshold number
of signatures on, which are those items it issues a
signature share on towards the receipt.
The peers first of all run an optimistic protocol: this
will succeed if at least a threshold of the local bulletin
boards agree, which will be the case in practice if all
peers are working properly. The optmistic protocol
is given as follows:
1. Pi → Pj : sigski(p,Bi,p) (j 6= i)
Pi checks a threshold of boards agree
2. Pi → WBB : Bi,p, sigsski(p,Bi,p) (i ∈ I)
The peers each sign their local copy of the bulletin
board, and send them to each other. If a threshold
agree then they can issue the bulletin board and a
share of the threshold signature on the board. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.
If the optimistic protocol does not run successfully,
because the signed boards do not agree, that indicates
that local bulletin boards are different. In this case
the peers exchange information about their bulletin
boards using the fallback protocol as follows:
1. Pi → Pj : Di,p (j 6= i)
each Pi updates its database with new data
Each peer sends its database Di,p of signatures it
has collected from the posting period to all the
other peers, which update their databases with any
signatures that are missing. They can then recalcu-
late their local bulletin board. This is illustrated in
Figure 3. Observe that the database Di,p consists of
signed items, so any dishonest or compromised peer
can only include information that has been properly
signed by some peer. It can inject fake items by
adding its own signature, but such items will not
have been previously circulated so will have no other
signatures in the peers’ databases, thus the honest
peers will not include them in their versions of the
bulletin board Bi,p.
After the fallback protocol is completed, the peers
return to the optimistic protocol and repeat. This is
only required once under our liveness and threshold
assumptions. We assume for liveness either (1) that
all peers are online and able to communicate during
the fallback protocol (with no assumptions about the
posting phase or correct behaviour of users), or (2)
that a threshold of honest peers are online and able
to communicate during the fallback protocol, and at
every stage of the posting phase a threshold set of
peers were live and able to communicate and that the
posting users behaved honestly. Under either of these
two assumptions only one round of the fallback pro-
tocol is needed. If neither of the liveness assumptions
hold then the protocol still behaves safely and ensures
correctness of the bulletin board when it is published,
but additional rounds of the fallback protocol may be
required.
The difference with Byzantine Agreement protocols
[Lyn96], which tend to require up to (n−t)+1 rounds
to achieve agreement, is that the databases the peers
start with have some consistency between them. If
thresholds of peers received posts correctly in the
posting phase, then the honest peers involved in the
exchange of information in the fallback protocol will
all obtain the full bulletin board after one round.
III. MODELLING AND VERIFICATION
FRAMEWORK
We use the action systems approach of Event-
B [Abr10], [MAV05] as our formal framework to
model the protocol and to verify it. In this approach
systems are described in terms of the states that they
can be in, and the events that transform the state.
A system is defined as a machine, which encapsulates
its state, and its events. State information is described
in terms of state variables and invariants on them.
The machine describes how the state is initialised,
and how it can be updated with events.
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sigSSK(x)
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Fig. 1. Posting Protocol
machine M
variables v
invariant I(v)
events init, ev, . . .
end
ev =̂
when G(v)
then v :| BA(v, v′)
end
Fig. 4. Template of an Event-B machine and an event.
The Event-B approach supports refinement, a re-
lationship showing when one system implements
another. This approach allows a specification to be
captured as an ideal machine that expresses the
required behaviour. An implementation satisfies the
specification if it is a refinement.
Figure 4 illustrates how a machine is defined. Ma-
chine M is given with a list of state variables v, a state
invariant I(v), and a set of events ev, . . . to update the
state. Initialisation is a special event init which sets
the initial state of the machine, and its guard is true.
Each event has a guard G(v) over the variables v,
and a body, usually written as an assignment S on
the variables. The assignment is associated with a
before-after predicate BA(v, v′) describing changes
of variables upon event execution, in terms of the
relationship between the variable values before (v)
and after (v′). In Event-B an event may also introduce
local variables, which can be included in the guard
(which constrains what values they can take), and in
the body where they can be used to define the change
of state. Such events are constructed as:
evt =̂ any x
where G(v, x)
then v :| BA(v, x, v′)
end
Some of the conditions on x may be included in
the any clause rather than the where clause for
readability (see e.g. post and a msg1 of Figure 5).
Nondeterministic assignment has its own syntax:
x :∈ S assigns x some arbitrary element of S. This is
an abbreviation for
any s where s ∈ S then x := s end.
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sigsk1(p,B1)
sigsk2(p,B2)
sigsk4(p,B4)
sigsk3(p,B3)
B, sigssk4(p,B)
B, sigssk3(p,B)
B, sigssk2(p,B)
B, sigssk1(p,B)
Round 2
Public
Round 1
check threshold of Bi match
set B = Bi
Each
Peeri:
Fig. 2. Optimistic Protocol
We also note a technical Event-B condition: that in
these models all events have some feasible final state:
whenever G(v, x) is true then there is some v′ such
that BA(v, x, v′) holds. This means that we need not
be concerned with proof conditions for establishing
feasibility.
The Event-B approach to semantics, provided in
[Abr10], [MAV05], is to associate proof obligations
with machines. The key proof obligation on an event
is that it preserves the invariant: when an event is
called within its guard, then the state resulting from
executing the body should meet the invariant. This is
true for the machines presented in this paper.
A. Event-B refinement
In Event-B, the intended refinement relationship
between machines is directly written into the
refinement machine definitions. As a consequence
of writing a refining machine, a number of proof
obligations arise. Here, a machine and its refinement
take the following form:
machine M0
variables v
invariant I(v)
events init0, ev0, ev′0, . . .
end
machine M1
refines M0
variables w
invariant J(v,w)
events init1, ev1, ev′1, . . .
end
The machine M0 is refined by machine M1, written
M0 4 M1, if the given linking invariant J(v,w) on
the variables of the two machines is established by
their initialisations, and preserved by all events. Any
transition performed by a concrete event of M1 can
be matched by a step of the corresponding abstract
event of M0, or matched by skip for newly introduced
events, in order to maintain J. This is similar to the
approach of downwards simulation data refinement
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D1,p
D2,p
D4,p
D3,p
D1,p = D1,p ∪ D2,p ∪ D3,p ∪ D4,p
D2,p = D1,p ∪ D2,p ∪ D3,p ∪ D4,p
D3,p = D1,p ∪ D2,p ∪ D3,p ∪ D4,p
D4,p = D1,p ∪ D2,p∪ D3,p ∪ D4,p
Round 1
Update
Fig. 3. Fallback Protocol
[DB01], where the simulation relation plays the role
of the linking invariant. Formally, the refinement
relation M0 4 M1 between abstract machine M0 and
concrete machine M1 holds if the following proof
obligations given below hold for all events:
GRD REF: Guard Strengthening If a concrete
event matches an abstract one, then this rule requires
that when the concrete event is enabled, then so is
the matching abstract one.
INV REF: Simulation There are two parts to this
rule. INV REF1 ensures that the occurrence of
events (including initialisation) in the concrete ma-
chine can be matched in the abstract one. INV REF2
is concerned with new events, which are treated as
refinements of skip. In this case the abstract state
does not change.
Refinement with respect to A: It may be that an
environment interacts with a machine M0 only on
some subset A of its events. In that case we can
consider a refinement M1 of M0 with respect to A.
This requires that M1 also has all the events A, and
that GRD REF and INV REF1 must hold for all
the events in A. However, other events of M1 can
be matched either by skip, or by some matching
event (not in A) in M0, in which case the guard must
also match. We will use this notion of refinement
to express our requirements on the bulletin board
protocol, with the set A = {post, ack, publish}.
B. Framework for Bulletin Board Modelling and
Verification
We are concerned with developing a peered bulletin
board that can operate correctly in an unreliable
environment, and with some potentially misbehaving
peers. In particular, communications between the
bulletin board and its users may be under the control
of an adversary, who may intercept, divert, block,
duplicate and spoof messages. The bulletin board is
designed for use in in such an environment.
The specification of the bulletin board will encapsu-
late the required behaviour. This will be described
as an Event-B model BBSpec with a description
in terms of the architecture shown in Figure 5, of
an ideal bulletin board in the context of a reliable
communication medium. Users may use the events
post, ack and publish to interact with the bulletin
board, but communication occurs via the medium.
7EA
Ideal BB
a msg1
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a msg2
a msg3
ack
Fig. 5. BBSpec: ideal bulletin board and communication medium
The bulletin board has its own corresponding inter-
actions with the medium, labelled a msg1, a msg2
and a msg3. These events are also within the model
BBSpec, but they are not accessible directly to users.
Hence it is the behaviour of BBSpec on the set of
events {post, ack, publish} that must be matched by
any implementation.
The bulletin board implementation uses a number
of peers, for robustness and in order to distribute
trust. There are a total of n peers, and we use a
threshold signature scheme in which we require t
shares in order to produce a signature. Our model
of the protocol will be an Event-B model BBProt, in
which we consider the adversary to control the com-
munication medium to and from the peers and the
WBB, and between them. Hence any communication
can be blocked. We also consider that the adversary
can control up to n − t peers. This means that such
peers can sign and create any messages for sending,
whether or not such messages are in accordance with
the protocol, provided they have the appropriate keys.
We consider that (at least) a threshold t of the n peers
are honest: that they follow the protocol. Without
loss of generality we will consider peers 1 to t to
be honest, and t + 1 to n may behave arbitrarily
(which includes honest behaviour). This labelling
of the peers captures the general case where some
arbitrary n − t peers may be dishonest, since the
protocol is symmetric with respect to the labelling
of the peers.
The model BBProt includes the Dolev-Yao adversary,
and peers t+1 to n considered to be under the control
E
Peer 1
Peer 2
Peer 4
Peer 3
post ack publish
Real BB
c msgi
Fig. 6. BBProt: Protocol model for analysis, with t = 3 and n = 4
of the adversary. The setup is illustrated in Figure 6.
BBProt offers the same three external events as
BBSpec, namely post, ack and publish. However it
contains the peers explicitly, including peers con-
trolled by the adversary, and so the communication
patterns with and between the peers will be quite
different to those in the specification. Those com-
munications are modelled by events c msgi. The
requirement for correctness will be that BBSpec 4
BBProt with respect to {post, ack, publish}.
The model BBProt includes the events that make
up the various bulletin board protocols. Since these
events can be performed whenever their guards are
true, this means that interleavings of different proto-
cols are naturally considered within this framework.
Thus our approach to verification automatically al-
lows for possible interference between the protocols,
and a proof of correctness establishes that the proto-
cols cannot interfere in an adverse way.
IV. BULLETIN BOARD MODELLING
A. Specification
The ideal behaviour of the bulletin board is given
according to the specification BBSpec of Figure 7.
Receipts will be issued with the period the item was
posted in, and a bulletin board will be published for
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variables EA,Rp,Cp (p ∈ N)
invariant EA ⊆ ITEM ∪ RECEIPT ∪ PUBLISH
Rp ⊆ ITEM (p ∈ N)
Cp ⊆ ITEM (p ∈ N)
events
init =̂ EA := {} ‖ ‖p∈N(Rp := {} ‖ Cp := {})
post(x) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM
then EA := EA ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (EA ∩ RECEIPT);
P←− publish =̂ P :∈ (EA ∩ PUBLISH);
a msg1 =̂
any x, p
where x ∈ EA ∩ ITEM
∧ p ∈ N ∧ clashset(x) ∩ (⋃p Rp) = {}
then Rp := Rp ∪ {x}
end;
a msg2 =̂
any x, p
where x ∈ Rp ∧ (sigSSK(p,B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B)
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK(p, x)}
‖ Cp := Cp ∪ {x}
end;
a msg3 =̂
any Y, p
where Cp ⊆ Y ⊆ Rp ∧ EA ∩ PUBLISHp = {}
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK(p,Y)}
end
end
Fig. 7. BBSpec: specification of ideal bulletin board behaviour
this period. We define
RECEIPT = {sigSSK(p, x) | x ∈ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N}
PUBLISH = {sigSSK(p,B) | B ⊆ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N}
PUBLISHp = {sigSSK(p,B) | B ⊆ ITEM}
The model uses the set EA to capture the contents
of the communication medium between the user and
the bulletin board as shown in Figure 5. Messages
are sent by adding messages to EA (as in the de-
scriptions of post, a msg2 and a msg3), and received
by obtaining them from EA (as in ack, publish and
a msg1).
The external events of BBSpec capture the interac-
tions available to the user: post(x) allows a value
x to be sent to the bulletin board; r ←− ack
occurs when a receipt r = sigSSK(p, x) is output
as acknowledgement of posting of an item x; and
P←− publish is the output of a signed bulletin board
P = sigSSK(p,B).
The internal events describe the behaviour for the
bulletin board. The event a msg1 models the posting
of an item x in period p. The bulletin board may
refuse posts if they are inconsistent with previously
accepted posts. We express this by introducing an
irreflexive symmetric binary relation clash such that
clash(x, x′) captures when two items x and x′ should
not both appear on the bulletin board. For conve-
nience we define clashset(x) = {x′ | clash(x, x′)} to
be the set of all events that clash with x. The guard
of the event expresses that x will be accepted if there
is no x′ already received in any period clashing with
x: in other words, that clashset(x) ∩ (⋃p Rp) = {}.
Allowing for untrusted peers requires us to include
some nondeterminism within the specification of the
bulletin board. In particular, dishonest peers and
the untrusted medium can prevent or delay receipts
from being issued for some received posts, so the
specification must allow for this possibility. The
model specifying the bulletin board thus uses two
databases: R consisting of received posts, and C
consisting of confirmed posts—those which have
been acknowledged with receipts. a msg2 models
the issuing of a receipt, and in accordance with the
inherent nondeterminism allows for a receipt to be
issued even after the board is published, provided
the item is on the board as required by (bb.2).
Finally, a msg3 provides the published board: any
item published must be in R in accordance with
(bb.1); and all confirmed posts C must be published
in accordance with (bb.2). Thus we require C ⊆ Y ⊆
R for a published board Y . In other words, items
that have been submitted to the bulletin board but
not confirmed might or might not appear in Y . We
retain a level of uncertainty over what is published,
because this level of uncertainty is present in the
implementation when some of the bulletin board
peers are untrusted. a msg3 allows no more than one
bulletin board to be published for any period, meeting
requirement (bb.4): once published, the bulletin board
is fixed.
Observe that if every posting has a receipt, then the
bulletin board will contain all posted items: (C =
B = R).
The resulting Event-B model is given in Figure 7.
9This is the specification that we will show is met by
our design. The model includes a bulletin board and
its environment. As well as the state of the bulletin
board, we include the state EA of the environment,
containing the communications that it is managing,
because we will want to consider the bulletin board
protocol design in a model including the Dolev-Yao
adversary, which provides an asynchronous commu-
nication medium.
We see that BBSpec exhibits the original require-
ments (bb.1)–(bb.4). (bb.1) holds because any pub-
lished bulletin board is a subset of the items in Rp,
which is a subset of the items in E, and any item
x in E must be there as a result of post(x); hence
only posted items can appear on the bulletin board.
(bb.2) holds because Cp contains the items for which
a receipt has been provided, and a msg3 states that a
bulletin board for period p must contain at least the
events in Cp. (bb.3) holds because two clashing items
can never both be present in the set of all received
posts
⋃
p Rp, because the guard in a msg1 prevents
acceptance of items that clash with previous ones.
(bb.4) follows because a msg3 ensures that at most
one bulletin board will be published for any period p:
once a signed bulletin board is output then it cannot
be overwritten or superceded.
The fact that BBSpec satisfies the requirements
(bb.1)–(bb4) means that any refinement of BBSpec
will also meet these requirements.
B. Event-B Modelling and analysis
The threat model built into the model of the pro-
tocol incorporates our robustness considerations, in
particular that the correctness of the bulletin board
is not dependent on the correct behaviour of any
individual component, as long as a threshold behave
correctly. It allows for the case where peers behave
honestly but occasionally are down (either through
connection loss, or through temporary server loss):
this is modelled simply by the absence of messages
between the communication medium and the peer,
and allows for peers to miss some posts. The model
also includes the case where peers t+1 to n can lose
or otherwise alter their databases of received posts.
However, the honest peers 1 to t do not lose their
databases: for correctness we require that a threshold
of peers do not lose their data.
The set MESSAGE of all possible messages m in the
model is given as follows:
m ::= k | i | sigk(m) | {m1, . . . ,mn} | (p,m)
` {}
{k,m} ` sigk(m)
#S > t⇒ {sigsskk(m) | k ∈ S} ` sigSSK(m)
{sigk(m)} ` m
{m,B} ` B ∪ {m}
m ∈ B⇒ {B} ` m
{p,m} ` (p,m)
{(p,m)} ` p,m
Fig. 8. Dolev-Yao adversary derivations
where k ∈ KEY , i ∈ ITEM, p ∈ N, {. . .} denotes
the set of messages listed, and (p,m) denotes a pair.
Observe that a message can itself consist of a set of
messages, and thus MESSAGE covers all rounds of
the protocol. In particular RECEIPT ⊆ MESSAGE
and PUBLISH ⊆ MESSAGE.
The Dolev-Yao environment: The Dolev-Yao adver-
sary is modelled through the use of the set E to retain
all messages that are sent and received by protocol
parties. The adversary is also able to generate new
messages to introduce into protocol executions. In
particular, he can sign any message with any key that
he possesses; he can combine shares of a signature
into a threshold signature; he can extract the message
from a signature; and he can add and remove mes-
sages from a set of messages. These capabilities are
captured in the derivation rules of Figure 8, which
show how a new message can be generated from a
set of messages. We will model adversary behaviour
by including an event for each rule, allowing the
adversary to introduce new events to the set E.
C. Simulation
We aim to establish that the concrete system BBProt
refines the abstract system BBSpec with respect to
the external events {post, ack, publish}.
To establish refinement we show that any concrete
move can be matched by an abstract move, or (for
events other that post, ack and publish) matched
by skip. To do this we need to identify the linking
invariant, the relationship between the abstract and
concrete states, and show that any concrete move
from a concrete state is matched for any correspond-
ing abstract state by some abstract move or skip.
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Linking invariant
We thus have to identify when, in the concrete sys-
tem, abstract events are considered to have occurred.
• abstract a msg1 occurs when the bulletin board
receives x. In the concrete model this corre-
sponds to t peers having received x and signed it.
Since there can be up to n − t dishonest peers,
this means t − (n − t) = 2t − n honest peers
having signed x.
• abstract a msg2 occurs when the bulletin board
issues a signature on (p, x). This corresponds to
the combining of t returns of signature shares
sigsskj(p, x).
• abstract a msg3 occurs when a signed database
sigSSK(p, t(D)) is produced. This corresponds to
the combining of t returns of signature shares
sigsskj(p, t(D)).
The abstract state sA is the pair of databases R and
C, and medium EA.
The concrete state sC is the set of databases Ij, Dj and
pubj for the peers, E for the Dolev-Yao environment.
For the linking invariant to relate the abstract state
to the concrete state:
• Rp is the set of items for which the adversary
(and possibly other peers) can provide a thresh-
old of sigskj(p, x), and so can include x on the
published bulletin board. If at least 2t−n honest
peers have signed (p, x), then it is within the
adversary’s control to produce a further n − t
signatures, giving a threshold of signatures on
(p, x).
• Cp is the set of items for which the adversary has
a receipt—evidence that sufficiently many peers
have a threshold of sigskj(p, x) to ensure that it
will appear on the published bulletin board.
These are expressed in Clauses (9) and (10) respec-
tively of BBProt given in Figure 9.
D. Implementation
In the implementation, each peer maintains a counter
pj which it uses to track the period it is currently
accepting posts for. The counter will be incremented
when it has finished accepting posts for one period
and begins accepting posts for the next. It also
maintains a separate state space for each period. For
example, BBProt will use Rj,p for j’s record of what
it received in period p, and so will have a separate
set for each period.
The resulting model BBProt is given in the various
clauses below. The model is shown in the events
within the description. The key to the refinement
proof is that the interleaving of the events across the
different periods do not interfere, even though peers
can progress their periods independently and can be
involved in publication of one bulletin board while
receiving items for another.
Declaration and Invariant: Two further definitions
will be useful when expressing the model:
SIG1p = {sigSSK(p, x) | x ∈ ITEM}
t(D) = {x | #{k | sigskk(x) ∈ D} > t}
Given a set D of signed items, the set t(D) is those
items for which D contains a threshold number of
different signatures. If D is used to track the signed
items received by a peer, then t(D) is those items for
which it has received a threshold number.
The invariant properties are the key to the proof of
refinement, and hence of correctness. These are given
in Figure 9. Clauses (1)–(8) are the key invariant
properties of the refinement machine BBProt itself,
and (9)–(11) capture the linking invariant which
relates the refinement to the abstract machine BBSpec
and hence establishes the refinement relationship.
The invariant clauses give relationships between var-
ious parts of the state of BBProt. (1)–(8) capture
behaviour exhibited by the honest peers j where
1 6 j 6 t. (1) states that for any honest peer j,
if j has provided a signature share on x for period
p and also on board B for the same period, then
the post x must be on the board B. This captures
one aspect of honest behaviour. (2) states that if
j’s signature share on (p, x) has been communicated
then j has received at least the threshold t number
of signatures on (p, x). (3) states that if a threshold
signature on (p, x) has been constructed then at least
thre threshold number of signature shares on (p, x)
have been communicated. (4) states that if j has
communicated a signature share on a board B then j
must have received at least t peer signatures for each
item on B. (5) states that if a threshold signature
on (p,B) has been constructed then a threshold of
signature shares on (p,B) have been communicated.
(6) states that all the peer signatures received by an
honest peer have been communicated. (7) states that
if peer j has produced a signature share on (p,B) then
its current period must be greater than p. (8) states
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that j will provide a signature share on at most one
bulletin board for any period p. All of these clauses
are true after initialisation, and they are established
to be preserved by each of the events of BBProt,
including attacker events. Hence they are true in any
state that BBProt can be brought to.
The linking invariant is given by clauses (9)–(11).
Clauses (9) and (10) were described on the previous
page; clause (11) states that the abstract set of
communications is the projection of the concrete set
to the abstract messages. The linking invariant under-
pins Lemma IV.2, which establishes the refinement
relation between BBSpec and BBProt: given a pair
of linkes states of BBSpec and BBProt, each event
in BBProt can be matched either by no progress
(i.e. skip) within BBSpec, or by the equivalent event
within BBSpec, whereby the linking invariant contin-
ues to hold in the resulting states.
External events: External events are modelled as in
Figure 10.
Posting and acknowledgement protocol: Posting and
acknowledgement captures the protocol of Figure 1
as input and output events between the individual
peers and the medium. Peerj may only accept and
acknowledge items, and issue its share of the receipt,
for items in its current period. The associated events
are given in Figure 11.
Commit and publish protocol: The commit protocol
for the bulletin board of period pj is started by incre-
menting pj. Thus no further posts will be accepted for
that bulletin board, and the events in the commit and
publish protocols are then enabled. These are given
in Figure 12.
Dolev-Yao environment: As well as handling all com-
munication and thus having access to all messages
passed between the agents, the adversary has actions
corresponding to the derivations of Figure 8. These
are given in Figure 13.
This gives rise to some additional clauses in the
invariant as shown in Figure 14, to capture the
limits of what the adversary can introduce. These are
necessary for the refinement proof, in particular to
establish that the concrete adversary can only gener-
ate protocol messages that the abstract adversary can
generate, and that the additional message fragments
(for example shares of threshold signatures) do not
give the adversary any additional power.
machine BBProt
refines BBSpec
variables E, Ij,p, Dj,p, Sj,p, cj, pj (1 6 j 6 t)
invariant
/* Types */
E ⊆ MESSAGE
Ij,p ⊆ ITEM
Dj,p ⊆ {sigskk(p, x) | x ∈ ITEM}
Sj,p ⊆ {sigskk(p,B) | B ⊆ ITEM}
cj ∈ N
pj ∈ N
/* Key invariant properties */
1 6 j 6 t⇒
(1) j ∈ c[p, x] ∧ j ∈ s[p,B]⇒ x ∈ B
(2) sigsskj(p, x) ∈ E ⇒ #dj[p, x] > t
(3) sigSSK(p, x) ∈ E ⇒ #c[p, x] > t
(4) sigsskj(p,B) ∈ E ⇒ B ⊆ t(Dj,p)
(5) sigSSK(p,B) ∈ E ⇒ #s[p,B] > t
(6) Dj,p ⊆ E
(7) j ∈ s[p,B]⇒ cj > p
(8) j ∈ s[p,B1]
∧ B1 6= B2 ⇒ j 6∈ s[p,B2]
/* linking invariant */
(9) Rp =
{x ∈ ITEM | #{j | 1 6 j 6 t
∧ sigskj(p, x) ∈ E} > 2t − n}
(10) Cp = {x ∈ ITEM | sigSSK(p, x) ∈ E}
(11) EA = E ∩ (ITEM ∪ RECEIPT
∪ PUBLISH)
where:
dj[p, x] = {1 6 k 6 n | sigskk(p, x) ∈ Dj}
c[p, x] = {1 6 k 6 n | sigsskk(p, x) ∈ E}
s[p,B] = {1 6 k 6 n | sigsskk(p,B) ∈ E}
Fig. 9. BBProt: declaration of variables and invariant
E. Simulation
The following counting lemma is useful in the re-
finement proofs:
Lemma IV.1. If A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, B ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
#A > t, #B > t, and t > 2n/3, then there is some
j 6 t such that j ∈ A and j ∈ B.
Thus we obtain the key result: that BBProt provides
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events
init =̂ E := {skk | k > t} ∪ {sskk | k > t} ‖
‖j,n(Ij,n := {} ‖ Dj,n := {}
‖ Sj,n := {} ‖ pj := 0 ‖ cj := 0);
post(x) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM
then E := E ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (E ∩ RECEIPT);
P←− publish =̂ P :∈ E ∩ PUBLISH;
Fig. 10. BBProt: external events
c msg1j(x) =̂ /* receive item x */
when x ∈ E ∩ ITEM
then Ij,pj := Ij,pj ∪ {x}
end;
c msg2aj =̂ /* send signature share on x */
any x
where
x ∈ Ij,pj ∧
clashset(x) ∩ {y | ∃ p′. skj(p′, y) ∈
⋃
p Dj,p}
= {}
then E := E ∪ {sigskj(pj, x)}
‖ Dj,pj := Dj,pj ∪ {sigskj(pj, x)}
end;
c msg2bj =̂ /* receive signature share on x */
any x, k
where sigskk(pj, x) ∈ E
then Dj,pj := Dj,pj ∪ {sigskk(pj, x)}
end;
c msg3j =̂ /* send signature share */
any x
where x ∈ t(Dj,pj)
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj(pj, x)}
end;
Fig. 11. BBProt: Posting and acknowledgement
an implementation of BBSpec:
Lemma IV.2. BBSpec 4 BBProt with respect to
{post, ack, publish}
Proof (sketch)
We need to prove that if J(sA, sC), and sC
mC−→ s′C then
either J(sA, s′C) (mc is matched by skip), or ∃mA, s′A
such that sA
mA−→ s′A and J(s′A, s′C) (mc is matched by
mA).
c msg4j =̂ /* start commit protocol */
begin
pj := pj + 1
end;
c msg5aj =̂ /* send database */
any p < pj
then E := E ∪ {Dj,p}
end;
c msg5bj =̂ /* receive k’s database */
any D, p
where D ∈ E ∧ D ⊆ SIG1p ∧ p < pj
then Dj,p := Dj,p ∪ D
end;
c msg6j =̂ /* publish signature share */
when cj < pj ∧
#{k | sigskk(cj, t(Dj,cj)) ∈ Sj,cj} > t
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj(cj, t(Dj,cj))}
‖ cj := cj + 1
end;
c msg7aj =̂ /* send signed board */
any p < pj
then E := E ∪ {sigskj(p, t(Dj,p))}
end;
c msg7bj =̂ /* receive signed board */
any B, p
where sigskj(p,B) ∈ E ∧ p < pj
then Sj,p := Sj,p ∪ {sigskj(p,B)}
end;
Fig. 12. BBProt: commitment protocols (fallback and optimistic)
The proof establishes each case in turn. We show two
key example cases: c msg2a and c dy2
Case c msg2a. Peer j → DY : sigskj(pj, x). If #{k |
1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk(pj, x) ∈ E} = 2t − n − 1 and
#{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk(pj, x) ∈ E′} = 2t − n
then matched by mA = a msg1 for x, pj. Otherwise
matched by skip.
Case c dy2. If x ∈ ITEM and sigSSK(p, x) 6∈ E
and sigSSK(p, x) ∈ E′, then this is matched by
a msg2. It remains to show that (1) x ∈ Rp and (2)
sigSSK(p,B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B.
1) x ∈ Rp: We have that #c[p, x] > t. Hence
there is some k 6 t with k ∈ c[p, x], so by
invariant (2) it follows that #dk[p, x] > t. By
invariant (6) it follows that #{k | sigskk(p, x) ∈
E} > t, and hence that #({k | sigskk(p, x) ∈
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c dy1 =̂ /* signature share on m */
any m, s
where m ∈ E ∧ s ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {sigs(m)}
end;
c dy2 =̂ /* threshold signature on m */
any S,m
where #S > t ∧ {sigsskk(m) | k ∈ S} ⊆ E
then E := E ∪ {sigSSK(m)}
end;
c dy3 =̂ /* extracting m from signature */
any m, s
where sigs(m) ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {m}
end;
c dy4 =̂ /* adding m to B */
any m,B
where m ∈ E ∧ B ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {B ∪ {m}}
end;
c dy5 =̂ /* extracting m from B */
any m,B
where B ∈ E ∧ m ∈ B
then E := E ∪ {m}
end;
c dy6 =̂ /* pairing */
any m, p
where m ∈ E ∧ p ∈ N
then E := E ∪ {(p,m)}
end;
c dy7 =̂ /* splitting */
any m, p
where (p,m) ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {p,m}
end
Fig. 13. BBProt: adversary actions
E} − {t + 1 . . . n}) > t − (n − t) = 2t − n.
Hence by (9) x ∈ Rp, as required.
2) sigSSK(p,B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B: Assume
sigSSK(p,B) ∈ EA. Then #s[p,B] > t by (5).
Also we have #c[p, x] > t, so by Lemma IV.1
there is some k 6 t with k ∈ c[p, x] and
k ∈ s[p,B]. Hence from (1) it follows that
x ∈ B as required.
If BC ⊆ ITEM and sigSSK(p,BC) 6∈ E and
sigSSK(p,BC) ∈ E′, then this is matched by a msg3,
/* adversary bound invariant */
E ∩ ({skk | k 6 t} ∪ {sskk | k 6 t}) = ∅⋃
e∈E items(e) ⊆ E⋃
e∈E sigs(e) ⊆ E
where
items(k) = {}
items(i) = {i}
items(sigk(x)) = items(x)
items({m1, . . . ,mn}) =
⋃
i items(mi)
items((p,m)) = items(m)
sigs(k) = {}
sigs(i) = {}
sigs(sigk(m)) = {sigk(m)} ∪ sigs(m)
sigs({m1, . . . ,mn}) =
⋃
i sigs(mi)
sigs((p,m)) = sigs(m)
Fig. 14. BBProt: invariant for adversary actions
with B = BC. We must show that (1) EA ∩
PUBLISH = {}, (2) Cp ⊆ BC and (3) BC ⊆ Rp.
1) EA ∩ PUBLISH = {}: we establish this by
contradiction. If sigSSK(p,B) ∈ EA for some
B 6= BC, then #s[p,B] > t by (5). Also we
have s[p,BC] > t by the guard of c dy2. Hence
from Lemma IV.1 there is some k 6 t with
k ∈ s[p,B] and k ∈ s[p,BC], contradicting (8).
2) C ⊆ BC: consider some x ∈ C. Then
sigSSK(p, x) ∈ E, so #c[p, x] > t by invari-
ant (3). Further, #s[BC] > t by invariant (5).
Hence from Lemma IV.1 there is some k 6 t
with k ∈ c[p, x] and k ∈ s[p,BC]. Hence by
invariant (1), x ∈ BC, as required.
3) BC ⊆ R: We have from invariant (3) that
sigsskj(p,BC) ∈ E for some j 6 t. Now consider
x ∈ BC. Then x ∈ t(Dj) by invariant (4).
Hence x ∈ t(E) by invariant (6), and so
#{k | 1 6 k 6 n ∧ skk(x) ∈ E} > t from
the definition of t(E), and hence #{k | 1 6
k 6 t ∧ skk(x) ∈ E} > 2t − n. Thus x ∈ R as
required.
Otherwise c dy2 is matched by skip.
The other cases follow a similar pattern. Full proofs
are provided in an extended version of this paper
posted at [CS14].
This concludes the proof that BBSpec 4 BBProt
with respect to {post, ack, publish}, establishing the
correctness of the bulletin board, and in particular
that it meets properties (bb.1)–(bb.4).
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V. DISCUSSION
A. Summary
In this paper we have presented a distributed protocol
for running a bulletin board using a number of peers,
which can tolerate a number of them failing, in the
context of a threat model which has the communi-
cation between the peers controlled by a Dolev-Yao
adversary, who also is able to control some of the
peers. This provides robustness and distributed trust:
the bulletin board can tolerate some peers failing,
and we require that a threshold of peers should be
honest but no individual peer is required to be trusted.
Provided a threshold of the peers behave according
to the protocol, the key properties demanded of the
bulletin board hold. In particular, only items posted
to the bulletin board will be posted on it, any item
whose receipt is acknowledged by the bulletin board
must be posted on it, and the bulletin board will not
accept conflicting items.
The development of the modelling and verification
approach for this kind of protocol is also one of
the contributions of this paper. Correctness has been
established formally using the Event-B framework,
using simulation to show that the protocol is a
refinement of an idealised bulletin board which has
the desired properties. The model included a Dolev-
Yao attacker and the description of the protocol steps
followed by the peers. Carrying out the proof iden-
tified some nondeterminism inherent in the protocol
and enabled us to include it in the idealisation to
document the possible behaviour of the implementa-
tion. In particular, an adversary can create a situation
where he controls whether or not an unreceipted item
appears on the bulletin board, and so this is reflected
as nondeterminism at the abstract level. In the context
of the vVote system this will not be an issue in
practice, since the voting ceremony requires that any
unreceipted items should be cancelled. Hence the
nondeterminism will not affect the tallying of the
election: either the cancellation appears alongside a
vote, or it appears without the vote, and in both cases
the vote will not be counted.
B. Related work
Other proposals for bulletin board implementations
using a set of peers are given by Krummenacher
[Kru10], by Peters [Pet05], and in the STAR-Vote
system [BBB+13]. These proposals all provide for
some robustness, but differ in terms of threat models
and in the properties that they provide, none of them
have been formally analysed, and none of them are
suitable for the context of the system for the Victorian
State Election. Krummenacher’s proposal does not
scale well with the number of votes to be posted,
since any post requires a lock on the peers. Peters’
approach uses a dynamic group membership protocol
to manage the changing availability of peers, and
the interaction of this protocol with the vote casting
protocol is not fully understood or formally analysed.
STAR-Vote is designed for use in a single polling
station, and the emphasis is on using replication to
detect incorrect behaviour rather than its automatic
correction, and to resolve discrepancies forensically.
Byzantine Agreement Protocols: The general prob-
lem of achieving generalised agreement across com-
ponents where some might fail in adverse ways is
known as the Byzantine Agreement problem [LSP82],
and there is an extensive literature on approaches to
the problem [Lyn96]. Such protocols require correct
behaviour in strictly more than 2/3 of the peers, the
same requirement as we have on our bulletin board
peers. However, Byzantine Agreement protocols are
not really suitable for items being posted. These
protocols are typically synchronous and proceed in
rounds, which would be too inefficient for receiving
large quantities of votes: too many rounds and too
much synchronisation overhead would be required
to process each vote if we wish the peers to agree
on the receipt of every vote. Furthermore, not all
peers would necessarily be aware when a protocol
run is starting, since they may not receive the initial
item. Instead we have provided a protocol for the
peers simply to send messages to each other and
to respond to messages received in an asynchronous
fashion. This means that the peers do not all need
to agree on each vote. Our threat model is also
different to the typical threat model for Byzantine
agreement protocols: ours allows honest peers to be
excluded from the acceptance of some items to the
bulletin board, without being considered as dishonest,
whereas Byzantine agreement protocols consider any
non-participating peer as failing.
We are closer to the problem of Byzantine agreement
in the commit and publish phase, since this is where
the peers seek consensus to agree on a bulletin board
to publish. Our optimistic and fallback protocols are
indeed close to the Floodset protocol [Lyn96], a
basic agreement protocol. Even in this case we do
not require the full power of Byzantine agreement
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protocols: the use of signatures minimises the ability
of dishonest peers to introduce additional confusing
information to disrupt the protocol run, and we
can limit the adversarial behaviour simply to peers
ceasing to communicate.
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